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Abstract
The occurrence of previously unseen malicious
code or malware is an implicit and ongoing issue for
all software-based systems. It has been recognized that
machine learning, applied to features statically
extracted from binary executable files, offers a number
of promising benefits, such as its ability to detect
malware that has not been previously encountered.
Nevertheless it is understood that these models will not
continue to perform equally well over time as new and
potentially less recognizable malwares occur. In this
study, we have applied a range of machine learning
models to the features extracted from a large collection
of software executables in Portable Executable format
ordered by the date the binary was first encountered,
consisting of both malware and benign examples,
whilst considering different training set configurations
and timeframes. We analyze and quantify the relative
performance deterioration of these machine learning
models on future test sets of these features, and discuss
some insights into the characteristics and rate of
machine
learning-based
malware
detection
performance deterioration and training set selection.

1. Introduction
In traditional virus detection systems, a list of
known threats are maintained and regularly updated as
new viruses are first encountered and identified. This
has the disadvantage that new malware, will for a
period not have been explicitly included in such threat
lists, leading to a period of vulnerability to such new
malwares after they arise.
An advantage of artificial intelligence (AI) or
machine learning (ML)-based approaches to malware
detection, is that they can potentially recognize
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malware, even when it has not been previously
encountered or is not included in a list of known
threats, based on models trained to probabilistically
identify malware from a potentially complex
combination of features present in the executable.
Nevertheless, machine learning-based approaches
also face challenges in detection of new malwares. It is
understood in data science practice in general that
predictive models can and will decline in performance
over time leading to the need for model maintenance.
In the case of malware detection this decline could
arise as more and increasingly novel malwares are
encountered. In this paper we consider the effects of
training set timeframes on model performance, in the
specific context of malware detection for softwares in
the very common Portable Executable (PE) binary
format used on Windows and other machines.
In this paper we consider a dataset consisting of
over 50,000 malware and benign software executable
examples collected over a period from 2012 to 2018
[1]. For each of these examples, which corresponds to
a PE format executable, over 20 static features have
been extracted. An additional attribute also included is
a time stamp of the date the software was first seen. In
[2], the authors have analyzed the performance of
machine learning models that were trained on these
features, for malware detection for softwares
encountered in the month following the dataset used to
train the models [2]. That is, these models represent
regularly re-trained models, trained on the most
recently observed malwares and benign softwares.
In this work, by contrast, we consider more
systematically the effect of training set period choice,
and choice of model on the future performance and
performance deterioration of the ML malware
detection models. We quantify the relative
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performance and specifically performance deterioration
of these models over time in terms of a number of
evaluation metrics, including accuracy, area under the
receiver operator characteristic curve (AUC), recall
and precision. We consider both the performance
deterioration from the end date of the training set for
various models, as well as the effect of different
historical durations of training sets.
The results highlight the relative rate of
performance deterioration of various different types of
models, suggesting the relative benefits of some forms
of predictive models for robust PE-format malware
detection versus others, and are also suggestive of
various interesting and unanswered questions about the
predictability, strengths and limitations of ML and AI
for security applications such as malware detection
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 reviews the relevant literature, Section 3
describes the methodology used, including the dataset
utilized, our data preprocessing steps, experimental
setup, the experiments carried out, and the metrics used
to evaluate results. Sections 4 includes the results of
our experiments and Section 5 discusses the
implications and research questions suggested by the
results. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.

2. Literature review
A large number of previous studies have considered
the application of machine learning-based predictive
models to detect malware [3],[4],[5] and [6]. Many
such studies have a partial limitation that they are
trained and evaluated on a large set of examples, taking
into account all examples regardless of date of
occurrence within the sample set. In real applications, a
challenge is that malwares and goodwares occurring
during a later period may be different from those seen
previously during the training period prior to model
deployment. That is, for example a model deployed in
January 2021 to detect malware, would not and could
not have been trained on examples of malware
including all of those first occurring up to the end of
2022 for example. As such, many evaluations of
machine learning malware detection do not evaluate
for any performance deterioration in the future.
At the same time, it is widely recognized in the
literature and practice that machine learning models do
deteriorate with time due to such phenomena as
concept drift [7],[8] and in the case of malware
detection this corresponds to the emergence of
additional and novel malwares over time.

However, academic studies to investigate such
model performance deterioration in detail over time,
and the characteristics of the effect of training set
selection on performance, are very rare. This may be
partly due to such factors as the experiencing of
deployed model performance deterioration is typically
encountered and addressed in industry or applied
settings where the results are not published; the
real-world deterioration of models has to-date not been
considered a core area of machine learning research;
and also the datasets to study this phenomenon may not
be readily available publicly or to researchers.
Our review of the literature indicates the significant
scarceness of academic articles currently addressing
this important question of quantifying malware
detection model deterioration with time on real-world
datasets. An initial study of such performance
deterioration in relation to malware detection is only
seen in the 2020 paper by the authors [9]. This scarcity
is also seen in relation to measuring model
deterioration over time in other application domains.
Our literature review identified just one article, this
being a very recent article from June 2020 [10],
addressing a similar issue of model performance
deterioration over time, in the case of that study in
relation to models built on Medicare datasets. In the
review of the literature by the authors of this 2020
article [10] they concluded “we could not find other
research works that investigate the relationship
between time and predictive model maintenance for
big data”, other than one other conference paper [11]
that they identify. The study in [11] also deals with a
study of maintaining predictive model performance for
Medicare fraud detection. Other studies assessing the
future performance of models trained on hospital
length of stay [12] and mortality [13] datasets for one
calendar quarter, on data from a subsequent calendar
quarter, while not focusing on the problem of model
maintenance per se, found little to no model
performance deterioration in that domain area.
Our literature review underscores the novelty of
the investigation in this current paper, but also
highlights that whilst there is a large academic body of
knowledge in relation to the design of novel ML and
artificial intelligence algorithms, the practically
significant topic of evaluating model deterioration with
time has been under-addressed to-date in the academic
literature.
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3. Methods
We utilized a data mining methodology in this
work to explore the effect of training set and model
selection on the future performance of malware
detection predictive models. We drew our data from a
published dataset [1] of the extracted features of over
50,000 malware and goodware executables. The
dataset is orderable by the date each binary was first
encountered.

3.1. Data Source
In total the dataset provides 50,123 instances of the
static features extracted from software executables that
consist of malware and benign software examples.
This dataset was chosen for this particular study as
it has the unusual characteristic that it allows ordering
of malware and goodware instances by date these have
been encountered, which as noted in [2] is not an
included property in many datasets previously utilized
in studies of machine learning-based malware detection
performance.
As described in [2], to construct the dataset, 27
features have been extracted from PE headers of these
executables that were originally collected by crawling
and collecting software examples over a period of 2012
to 2018. Also as per [2], of these features, 22 are
numerical attributes including, base of code, base of
data,
characteristics,
dynamic
link
library
characteristics, file alignment, image base, machine,
magic, number of relative virtual addresses and their
sizes, number of sections, number of symbols, PE type,
pointer-to-symbol table, size, size of code, size of
headers, size of image, size of initialized data, size of
optional header, size of uninitialized data, time date
stamp, and entropy. A further three textual attributes
include a list of dynamic libraries, functions and
compilers/tools used. Of these over 50,000 instances,
21,082 instances are benign files, and the remaining
29,041 are malware, making the dataset a fairly
balanced one.

3.2. Data Preparation
For the set of experiments performed for this paper
a range of data preparation and systematic dataset
segmentation activities were undertaken.
Initially, a small number of instances with invalid
dates or text, such as newline characters, were

manually removed. The attributes titled Magic,
PE_TYPE, and SizeOfOptionalHeader were then
removed because their values were identical amongst
all instances in the initial dataset. Other attributes such
as SHA1 and MD5 were removed because they
represent unique attributes per executable and so will
not benefit the training of machine learning models.
Finally,
the
attributes
TimeDateStamp
and
FirstSeenDate, representing dates, were treated
separately as providing a mechanism to order the
overall dataset into various train and validation subsets.
Once the data were preprocessed, they were
ordered by the attribute FirstSeenDate, and this
provides a basis to divide the dataset into groups of
varying size of train and test subsets, with multiples of
a group size being used to constitute model training
datasets or test sets to measure the future performance
of
models
trained
on
earlier
occurring
malware/goodware subsets.

3.3 Experiment Setup
Initially an open source Java-based machine
learning toolkit [14] was used to preliminarily explore
and visualize the performance of various base ML
models on the overall dataset and randomly sampled
subsets of that entire dataset. Models considered
included Bayesian models such as Naive Bayes and
Bayesian Networks; instance-based learners such as
k-Nearest Neighbors and k-Star; rule-based learners
such as JRip and PART and decision trees such as C4.5
(named J48 in this implementation), RandomTree,
RandomForest and REPTree. These were trained and
evaluated using 10-fold cross validation on the entire
dataset. A subset of the best performing of these were
identified and selected for further consideration in the
subsequent experiments. Additionally, meta-model
variations of these best performing models were also
trained and evaluated via 10-fold cross validation,
including Bagged, Boosted, Vote, Stack and Random
Committee meta versions.
Based on the inclusion of the term vectorized three
textual attributes not improving or slightly decreasing
model performance, we also chose to remove those
three attributes from the dataset to be used.
To conduct the subsequent experiments, Python
scripts were developed able to run multiple models and
consider multiple training set and validation set
combinations and segmentations, including in a
systematic fashion. . These scripts were used to call the
Java-based ML models [14] via a Python-to-Java
Python wrapper package.
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3.4 Experiments
The first group of experiments focused on
determining the rate of performance deterioration of
malware detection models once trained, and then tested
on future test sets. We chose the first 15,000 instances
as the model training and development data subset.
Models were trained and evaluated on this subset using
10-fold cross validation to best achieve generalizable
models.

Positive Rate TPR (y axis) (same as Recall) versus
False Positive FPR (x axis). Typically as the
classification threshold is lowered, False Positives and
True Positives go up, and the AUC provides a
summary measure of the model across all possible
choices of classification threshold.
Recall provides a measure of what proportion of all
the malwares in the test set are correctly identified by
the predictive model.

The performance of these developed models was
then tested on subsequently occurring subsets of 5000
instances of the overall dataset as ordered by
FirstSeenDate. That is, there were seven subsequent
test subsets, instances 15,001-20,000, 20,001-25,000
…… 45,001-50,000.

Precision quantifies what proportion of all of the
softwares that were predicted by the model to be
malware, were actually malware.

The rate of future deterioration of model
performance is not considered in reporting the results
of almost all previous malware detection models [3-6],
and so a goal of these experiments is to explore the
relative rate of decline in performance of various ML
models.

4.1. Model Performance Deterioration Over Time

A second group of experiments was carried out to
consider the performance of models trained on the
most recently occurring software instances as ordered
by time and immediately preceding the subset of
software being used to test the performance of the
model on. However, additionally the second group of
experiments considers the effect of the length of the
history of included recent instances on the future
performance of the trained model. That is, for example
whether all past software examples are used in model
training, a mid-length history (3 x group of 5000) or a
short history (2 x group of 5000). For each duration of
historical training subsets used, this training is done
with 10-fold cross validation, with the performance of
the trained models then further tested on the
immediately following group of 5000 after the training
and development subset.

3.5. Metrics of Evaluation
We have utilized several metrics to evaluate
performance, including accuracy, area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), recall
and precision.
Accuracy is the percentage of software instances
correctly classified by a model. AUC is considered a
good measure of discriminative performance of a
model across all possible classification thresholds [15]
as it represents the area under the curve of the True

4. Results
Table 1, shows listed first, the performance of the 6
best performing models, in terms of both AUC and
accuracy, when evaluated using 10-fold cross
validation on the initial training set of 15,000, and then
the performance of a number of other models also
trialled. The meta-model variations of the models, such
as via bagging, boosting, stacking, voting and random
committee were not found to improve performance
over that of the base models.
TABLE I. MODEL PERFORMANCE ON TRAINING SET EVALUATED USING
10-FOLD CROSS VALIDATION
MODEL

ACCURACY

AUC

PREC

RECALL

C4.8 (J48)

98.82

0.994

0.984

0.993

KNN (IBK)

99.25

0.993

0.989

0.996

JRIP

98.68

0.992

0.982

0.992

PART

98.91

0.994

0.985

0.993

RANDOMFO
 REST

99.55

0.999

0.994

0.997

RANDOMTR EE

99.19

0.992

0.989

0.995

LWL

83.88

0.937

0.825

0.860

NAIVEBAYES

72.66

0.903

0.665

0.911

SVM (SMO)

88.64

0.886

0.886

0.887

DECISIONTABLE

96.00

0.988

0.958

0.962

HOEFFDINGTREE

84.23

0.870

0.891

0.780

BAYESIANNE T

93.96

0.984

0.955

0.923
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Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the
accuracy, AUC, recall and precision respectively of the
top six models evaluated on each of the future test
subsets that occur over the subsequent time periods
after the ending time of the dataset subset used for
model training.

Figure 3. Recall of top 6 models trained on initial 15,000
instances using 10-fold cross validation and then tested on
subsequent groups of 5,000 instances

Figure 1. Accuracy of top 6 models trained on initial
15,000 instances using 10-fold cross validation and then
tested on subsequent groups of 5,000 instances

Figure 4. Precision of top 6 models trained on initial
15,000 instances using 10-fold cross validation and then
tested on subsequent groups of 5,000 instances

4.2. Effect of Length of History of Training Set
Used

Figure 2. AUC of top 6 models trained on initial 15,000
instances using 10-fold cross validation and then tested on
subsequent groups of 5,000 instances

In the second group of experiments we considered
experiments where the training/model development set
includes the most recent executable instances, but we
consider the varying durations of preceding history
used for training, including ranging from short
histories, mid-length histories to all previously seen
executables. The group-size was set at 5000, so the
short history was 10,000 (2 X 5000), the medium
history was 15,000 (3 X 5000) and the long history was
all preceding encountered software executables. For
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each of the seven test periods (i.e. instances
15,001-20,000, 20,001-25,000 ….. 45,001-50,000) the
model has been trained on each of the preceding
histories (the prior 10,000, the prior 15,000 and all
preceding instances) in each case using 10-fold cross
validation. Note that for the first test period
(15,0001-20,000), the 3 group (of 5000) history will
necessarily be the same as the all preceding
instances/groups history.
Figures 5 to 8 show the accuracy, AUC, recall and
precision respectively, of the best performing model,
Random Forest, trained using 10-fold cross validation
on the three historical durations and then evaluated on
each test group of 5,000.

Figure 5. Accuracy of Random Forest trained using 10-fold
cross validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2
groups, 3 groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test
Group

Figure 6. AUC of Random Forest trained using 10-fold cross
validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2 groups, 3
groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test Group

Figure 7. Recall of Random Forest trained using 10-fold
cross validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2
groups, 3 groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test
Group

Figure 8. Precision of Random Forest trained using 10-fold
cross validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2
groups, 3 groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test
Group

Figures 9 to 12 show the accuracy, AUC, recall
and precision respectively, of the Random Tree model,
another of the top six models from Experiment 1, in
order to consider any comparative or differing aspects.

Figure 9. Accuracy of Random Tree trained using 10-fold
cross validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2
groups, 3 groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test
Group
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5. Discussion
5.1. Model Performance Deterioration Over
Time

Figure 10. AUC of Random Tree trained using 10-fold cross
validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2 groups, 3
groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test Group

Considering the results of the first set of
experiments included in Section 4.1, it is noted that the
selected top performing models, all exhibit high
accuracy, precision, recall and AUC when trained and
evaluated via 10-fold cross validation on the initial
training set (Table 1). See first six rows of Table 1. for
the six highest performing models. This mirrors the
high discriminative performance found by numerous
other studies exploring the performance of machine
learning-based malware detection, for example [3-6].
The best performing models achieve an accuracy of
98.6% or above, and all six of the top performance
models achieve an AUC of over 0.99, RandomForest
the first in terms of AUC and accuracy, with an AUC
of 0.999.
However, the results from Experiment 1 show a
non-monotonic but substantial decrease in model
accuracy over time subsequent to training as shown in
Figure 1. RandomForest maintains accuracy the best,
ending with an accuracy of 82.3% by the final test set,
while C4.5 (J48) has the worst maintenance of
accuracy ending with an accuracy of 74.0% .

Figure 11. Recall of Random Tree trained using 10-fold cross
validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2 groups, 3
groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test Group

Figure 12. Precision of Random Tree trained using 10-fold
cross validation on historical training sets of lengths of 2
groups, 3 groups and all previous, and evaluated on the Test
Group

This highlights an element of ML and AI malware
detection models not quantified in a large number of
previously published studies, which often conclude
with the performance measures obtained by
cross-validation evaluation on a whole non-time
evolving dataset, without accounting for the reality of
practical deployment that the whole dataset,
particularly softwares only first encountered in the
future, are not available to include in the training set at
any given point in time.
Most interestingly, the results also show varied
accuracy deterioration rates between the six models
studied, but nevertheless notable declines in accuracy
with time, with accuracies by the final test sets,
representing 2018 data capture, up to 25% below that
exhibited by the models trained via cross-validation on
the training set, which represents up to a 25% decline
over the 5 years from training on 2012-2013 data until
testing in 2018. RandomForest by contrast, only drops
to 82.8% accuracy over the same 5 years, representing
an approximate 16% decline in accuracy.
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Additionally the somewhat erratic changes in
accuracy from one test set to another, with sometimes
accuracy increasing for a later test set than for its
preceding test set, shows the difficulty for an ML
model deployer to know with certainty how well the
malware detection will perform, even for a relatively
short period into the future. This has implications for
model selection, even where models are re-trained at
regular intervals.
As shown in Figure 2, it is notable that Random
Forest shows a significantly higher maintenance of
performance over time than the other high performing
models in terms of AUC. By the final test set
RandomForest’s AUC drops to 0.885 (compared to
0.999 on the development testset), still a high
performing AUC, with the next best model being
PART with 0.830. KNN is least effective in
maintaining AUC performance dropping to 0.750 by
the final test set (0.992 initially). To compare with the
other identified study of model performance
deterioration [11] that has a similar goal to quantify
performance deterioration albeit in the different
domain of Medicare fraud detection datasets, Random
Forest was also found to be the best performing model
in terms of AUC for a 2014-15 dataset they used to test
a previously trained model. It can also be noted that the
systematicness of our current paper is greater than
previous
studies,
considering
performance
deterioration over a large sequence of future test sets,
rather than just one or two future test sets. Maintenance
of performance in terms of recall however shows
differing results (Figure. 3)
Figure 3 summarizes model recall over time, upon
successive test sets, and this overall tends to decline at
a relatively constant rate between the six models. By
the last test set, some divergence in recall is seen, but
with a significant drop for all models, ranging from a
recall of approximately 0.756 for PART and dropping
to 0.658 for KNN. The counter-trend in recall around
the 35001 to 45000 section of the test sets, may be a
result of a feature of the dataset collection described in
[2], where from January to July 2016 malware
collection was suspended, affecting the mix of
softwares being inputted to the dataset during that
period.
Figure 4 summarizes model precision over time
subsequent to the end of the training set period.
Performance in terms of precision is relatively erratic
over time, and with significant performance differences
between the six models. Random Forest again performs
the best across the overall range of test sets, and

achieves a high precision of 0.964 by the last test set.
C4.5 (J48) by comparison achieves the poorest
precision by the last test set, with a precision of 0.736.
It is anticipated, but not yet comprehensively
demonstrated or even addressed in this current paper,
that the performance deterioration characteristics of
ML models trained on software artifacts such as
malare/goodware datasets will be more generalizable
than models developed for application domains that
can be nation or state dependent [12] or even city
specific [16].

5.2 Effect of Duration of Training Set History
Figures 5 to 8 summarize the effects of the length
of the history used in the training set of the ML-based
malware detection model considered, in these figures
the evaluation is done for Random Forest.
Observations include that in terms of accuracy of
the model considered, while the results are mixed and
somewhat variable, accuracy is sometimes lower for a
shorter history and sometimes higher as per Figure 5.
For example for test groups 35,001-40,000 and
45,001-50,000, the shortest training history (2 groups
or 10,000 instances) performs the best.
Additionally, the AUC of the model considered
tends to show mixed results in relation to the duration
of the training set history as per Figure 6. All previous
history/groups shows the lowest performance, rather
than the highest as might potentially be expected for
the 30,001-35,000, 40,001-45,000 and 45,001-50,000
test groups.
Interestingly the recall of the models considered
appears to show a clearer pattern of being higher as the
duration of the training set history decreases as per
Figure 7. This is an interesting result for malware
detection being considered in this study and for this
particular PE dataset. A possible explanation for this, is
that potentially with a longer history of examples
included, there is a greater divergence from the
malware examples encountered during the testing
period potentially leading to a decreased recall.
Finally the precision of the models considered
appears to generally be higher with an increase in
duration of the training set used as shown in Figure. 8.
As with accuracy and AUC, the shorter duration of the
training set, leads to a spike down in precision for
some future test set periods. Using the full executable
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history, high precision for Random Forest is
maintained, staying about 0.96 at all stages.
Figures 9 to 12, for a slightly lesser performing
model from Experiment 1, Random Tree, show similar
results in relation to mixed results in relation to
accuracy and AUC for length of historical training set
being used. It also again surprisingly shows a trend
towards higher recall, for a shorter history training set.
In terms of precision (Figure. 12), a clearer pattern that
a longer training set history, leads to higher precision.
In summary, the two different performing models show
fairly similar broad characteristics in response to the
length of history of the training set.
5.3 Discussion Summary

Overall, the results from both groups of
experiments highlight the complex relationships
between model selection, selection of training set, level
and rate of model performance deterioration and
evaluation metric used. In terms of model performance
maintenance over time subsequent to last training,
Random Forest performs the best and shows a
significantly higher AUC score for each test set
through time, maintaining an AUC of 0.88 on the 2018
test data, executables first seen five years after the
training period..
The somewhat unpredictable and hard to explain
swings in model performance is suggestive of the
uncertainty inherent in machine learning applications
in the security domain. They are suggestive of the need
for greater assurance safeguards and better
understanding of performance deterioration, to limit
risks in machine learning-based security applications.
Identifying models that demonstrate typically low rates
of performance deterioration between any potential
re-trainings, and identifying beneficial training period
durations for these, have significant practical
implications for more robust ML-based malware
detection.

6. Conclusion
In this paper we have described a systematic
analysis of performance maintenance of ML-based
malware detection models trained and then tested on a
range of data subsets drawn from a large dataset of
over 50,000 time-ordered malwares and goodwares,
spanning a period from 2012 to 2018. We have
considered both model performance deterioration with
time elapsed from time of training subset, and also the
effect of historical training set duration on the

performance of models evaluated on future test sets.
Results include interesting observations on the higher
and consistent AUC and precision performance of
Random Forest over time for the malware detection
dataset considered in the study and also the interesting
behavior of a number of the models considered, in
relation to improved recall as training history duration
is decreased rather than increased. The literature
review highlights the relative scarcity of studies
quantifying ML and AI model performance
deterioration over time on real-world datasets, not just
a scarcity of malware detection performance
deterioration studies but across other application
domains also.
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